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You are hereNo Treason, No. 1

No Treason, No. 1

By rbarnett - Posted on 04 August
2009

NO TREASON.

_____________

No. 1.

_____________

BY LYSANDER SPOONER

_____________

BOSTON:

PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHOR,

No. 14 Bromfield Street.

1867.

______________________________________________

Entered according to Act of congress, in the year 1867,

By LYSANDER SPOONER,

in the Clerk's office of the District Court of the United States, for the
District

of Massachusetts.

[*iii]

INTRODUCTORY.

_____________

The question of treason is distinct from that of slavery; and is the same
that it would have been, if free States, instead of slave States, had
seceded.

On the part of the North, the war was carried on, not to liberate slaves, but
by a government that had always perverted and violated the Constitution, to keep
the slaves in bondage; and was still willing to do so, if the slaveholders could
be thereby induced to stay in the Union.

The principle, on which the war was waged by the North, was simply this: That
men may rightfully be compelled to submit to, and support, a government that
they do not want; and that resistance, on their part, makes them traitors and
criminals.

No principle, that is possible to be named, can be more self-evidently false
than this; or more self-evidently fatal to all political freedom. Yet it
triumphed in the field, and is now assumed to be established. If it really be
established, the number of slaves, instead of having been diminished by the war,
has been greatly increased; for a man, thus subjected to a government that he
does not want, is a slave. And there is no difference, in principle --- but only
in degree --- between political and chattel slavery. The former, no less than
the latter, denies a man's ownership of himself and the products of his labor;
and [*iv] asserts that other men may own him, and dispose of him and his
property, for their uses, and at their pleasure.

Previous to the war, there were some grounds for saying that --- in theory,
at least, if not in practice --- our government was a free one; that it rested
on consent. But nothing of that kind can be said now, if the principle on which
the war was carried on by the North, is irrevocably established.

If that principle be not the principle of the Constitution, the fact should
be known. If it be the principle of the Constitution, the Constitution itself
should be at once overthrown.

[*5]

NO TREASON

No. 1.

I.

Notwithstanding all the proclamations we have made to mankind, within the
last ninety years, that our government rests on consent, and that that was the
rightful basis on which any government could rest, the late war has practically
demonstrated that our government rests upon force --- as much so as any
government that ever existed.

The North has thus virtually said to the world: It was all very well to prate
of consent, so long as the objects to be accomplished were to liberate ourselves
from our connexion with England, and also to coax a scattered and jealous people
into a great national union; but now that those purposes have been accomplished,
and the power of the North has become consolidated, it is sufficient for us ---
as for all governments --- simply to say: Our power is our right.

In proportion to her wealth and population, the North has probably expended
more money and blood to maintain her power over an unwilling people, than any
other government ever did. And in her estimation, it is apparently the chief
glory of her success, and an adequate compensation for all her own losses, and
an ample justification for all her devastation and carnage of the South, that
all pretence of any necessity for consent to the perpetuity or power of
government, is (as she thinks) forever expunged from the minds of the people. In
short, the North [*6] exults beyond measure in the proof she has given, that a
government, professedly resting on consent, will expend more life and treasure
in crushing dissent, than any government, openly founded on force, has ever
done.

And she claims that she has done all this in behalf of liberty! In behalf of
free government! In behalf of the principle that government should rest on
consent!

If the successors of Roger Williams, within a hundred years after their State
had been founded upon the principle of free religious toleration, and when the
Baptists had become strong on the credit of that principle, had taken to burning
heretics with a fury never seen before among men; and had they finally gloried
in having thus suppressed all question of the truth of the State religion; and
had they further claimed to have done all this in behalf of freedom of
conscience, the inconsistency between profession and conduct would scarcely have
been greater than that of the North, in carrying on such a war as she has done,
to compel men to live under and support a government that they did not want; and
in then claiming that she did it in behalf of the of the principle that
government should rest on consent.

This astonishing absurdity and self-contradiction are to be accounted for
only by supposing, either that the lusts of fame, and power, and money, have
made her utterly blind to, or utterly reckless of, he inconsistency and enormity
of her conduct; or that she has never even understood what was implied in a
government's resting on consent. Perhaps this last explanation is the true one.
In charity to human nature, it is to be hoped that it is.

II

What, then, is implied in a government's resting on consent?

If it be said that the consent of the strongest party, in a nation, is all
that is necessary to justify the establishment of a government that shall have
authority over the weaker party, it [*7] may be answered that the most despotic
governments in the world rest upon that very principle, viz: the consent of the
strongest party. These governments are formed simply by the consent or agreement
of the strongest party, that they will act in concert in subjecting the weaker
party to their dominion. And the despotism, and tyranny, and injustice of these
governments consist in that very fact. Or at least that is the first step in
their tyranny; a necessary preliminary to all the oppressions that are to
follow.

If it be said that the consent of the most numerous party, in a nation, is
sufficient to justify the establishment of their power over the less numerous
party, it may be answered:

First. That two men have no more natural right to exercise any kind of
authority over one, than one has to exercise the same authority over two. A
man's natural rights are his own, against the whole world; and any infringement
of them is equally a crime, whether committed by one man, or by millions;
whether committed by one man, calling himself a robber, (or by any other name
indicating his true character,) or by millions, calling themselves a
government.

Second. It would be absurd for the most numerous party to talk of
establishing a government over the less numerous party, unless the former were
also the strongest, as well as the most numerous; for it is not to be supposed
that the strongest party would ever submit to the rule of the weaker party,
merely because the latter were the most numerous. And as a matter of fact, it is
perhaps never that governments are established by the most numerous party. They
are usually, if not always, established by the less numerous party; their
superior strength consisting of their superior wealth, intelligence, and ability
to act in concert.

Third. Our Constitution does not profess to have been established simply by
the majority; but by "the people;" the minority, as much as the majority.
[*8]

Fourth. If our fathers, in 1776, had acknowledged the principle that a
majority had the right to rule the minority, we should never have become a
nation; for they were in a small minority, as compared with those who claimed
the right to rule over them.

Fifth. Majorities, as such, afford no guarantees for justice. They are men of
the same nature as minorities. They have the same passions for fame, power, and
money, as minorities; and are liable and likely to be equally --- perhaps more
than equally, because more boldly --- rapacious, tyrannical and unprincipled, if
intrusted with power. There is no more reason, then, why a man should either
sustain, or submit to, the rule of the majority, than of a minority. Majorities
and minorities cannot rightfully be taken at all into account in deciding
questions of justice. And all talk about them, in matters of government, is mere
absurdity. Men are dunces for uniting to sustain any government, or any laws,
except those in which they are all agreed. And nothing but force and fraud
compel men to sustain any other. To say that majorities, as such, have a right
to rule minorities, is equivalent to saying that minorities have, and ought to
have, no rights, except such as majorities please to allow them.

Sixth. It is not improbable that many or most of the worst of governments ---
although established by force, and by a few, in the first place --- come, in
time, to be supported by a majority. But if they do, this majority is composed,
in large part, of the most ignorant, superstitious, timid, dependent, servile,
and corrupt portions of the people; of those who have been over-awed by the
power, intelligence, wealth, and arrogance; of those who have been deceived by
the frauds; and of those who have been corrupted by the inducements, of the few
who really constitute the government. Such majorities, very likely, could be
found in half, perhaps nine-tenths, of all the countries on the globe. What do
they prove? Nothing but the tyranny and corruption of the very governments that
have reduced so large portions of [*9] the people to their present ignorance,
servility, degradation, and corruption; an ignorance, servility, degradation,
and corruption that are best illustrated in the simple fact that they do sustain
governments that have so oppressed, degraded, and corrupted them. They do
nothing towards proving that the governments themselves are legitimate; or that
they ought to be sustained, or even endured, by those who understand their true
character. The mere fact, therefore, that a government chances to be sustained
by a majority, of itself proves nothing that is necessary to be proved, in order
to know whether such government should be sustained, or not.

Seventh. The principle that the majority have a right to rule the minority,
practically resolves all government into a mere contest between two bodies of
men, as to which of them shall be masters, and which of them slaves; a contest,
that --- however bloody --- can, in the nature of things, never be finally
closed, so long as man refuses to be a slave.

III

But to say that the consent of either the strongest party, or the most
numerous party, in a nation, is sufficient justification for the establishment
or maintenance of a government that shall control the whole nation, does not
obviate the difficulty. The question still remains, how comes such a thing as "a
nation" to exist? How do millions of men, scattered over an extensive territory
--- each gifted by nature with individual freedom; required by the law of nature
to call no man, or body of men, his masters; authorized by that law to seek his
own happiness in his own way, to do what he will with himself and his property,
so long as he does not trespass upon the equal liberty of others; authorized
also, by that law, to defend his own rights, and redress his own wrongs; and to
go to the assistance and defence of any [*10] of his fellow men who may be
suffering any kind of injustice --- how do millions of such men come to be a
nation, in the first place? How is it that each of them comes to be stripped of
his natural, God-given rights, and to be incorporated, compressed, compacted,
and consolidated into a mass with other men, whom he never saw; with whom he has
no contract; and towards many of whom he has no sentiments but fear, hatred, or
contempt? How does he become subjected to the control of men like himself, who,
by nature, had no authority over him; but who command him to do this, and forbid
him to do that, as if they were his sovereigns, and he their subject; and as if
their wills and their interests were the only standards of his duties and his
rights; and who compel him to submission under peril of confiscation,
imprisonment, and death?

Clearly all this is the work of force, or fraud, or both.

By what right, then, did we become "a nation?" By what right do we continue
to be "a nation?" And by what right do either the strongest, or the most
numerous, party, now existing within the territorial limits, called "The United
States," claim that there really is such "a nation" as the United States?
Certainly they are bound to show the rightful existence of "a nation," before
they can claim, on that ground, that they themselves have a right to control it;
to seize, for their purposes, so much of every man's property within it, as they
may choose; and, at their discretion, to compel any man to risk his own life, or
take the lives of other men, for the maintenance of their power.

To speak of either their numbers, or their strength, is not to the purpose.
The question is by what right does the nation exist? And by what right are so
many atrocities committed by its authority? or for its preservation?

The answer to this question must certainly be, that at least such a nation
exists by no right whatever.

We are, therefore, driven to the acknowledgment that nations and governments,
if they can rightfully exist at all, can exist only by consent. [*11]

IV.

The question, then, returns, what is implied in a government's resting on
consent?

Manifestly this one thing (to say nothing of the others) is necessarily
implied in the idea of a government's resting on consent, viz: the separate,
individual consent of every man who is required to contribute, either by
taxation or personal service, to the support of the government. All this, or
nothing, is necessarily implied, because one man's consent is just as necessary
as any other man's. If, for example, A claims that his consent is necessary to
the establishment or maintenance of government, he thereby necessarily admits
that B's and every other man's are equally necessary; because B's and every
other man's right are just as good as his own. On the other hand, if he denies
that B's or any other particular man's consent is necessary, he thereby
necessarily admits that neither his own, nor any other man's is necessary; and
that government need to be founded on consent at all.

There is, therefore, no alternative but to say, either that the separate,
individual consent of every man, who is required to aid, in any way, in
supporting the government, is necessary, or that the consent of no one is
necessary.

Clearly this individual consent is indispensable to the idea of treason; for
if a man has never consented or agreed to support a government, he breaks no
faith in refusing to support it. And if he makes war upon it, he does so as an
open enemy, and not as a traitor that is, as a betrayer, or treacherous
friend.

All this, or nothing, was necessarily implied in the Declaration made in
1776. If the necessity for consent, then announced, was a sound principle in
favor of three millions of men, it was an equally sound one in favor of three
men, or of one man. If the principle was a sound one in behalf of men living on
a separate continent, it was an equally sound one in behalf of a man living on a
separate farm, or in a separate house. [*12]

Moreover, it was only as separate individuals, each acting for himself, and
not as members of organized governments, that the three millions declared their
consent to be necessary to their support of a government; and, at the same time,
declared their dissent to the support of the British Crown. The governments,
then existing in the Colonies, had no constitutional power, as governments, to
declare the separation between England and America. On the contrary, those
governments, as governments, were organized under charters from, and
acknowledged allegiance to, the British Crown. Of course the British king never
made it one of the chartered or constitutional powers of those governments, as
governments, to absolve the people from their allegiance to himself. So far,
therefore, as the Colonial Legislatures acted as revolutionists, they acted only
as so many individual revolutionists, and not as constitutional legislatures.
And their representatives at Philadelphia, who first declared Independence,
were, in the eye of the constitutional law of that day, simply a committee of
Revolutionists, and in no sense constitutional authorities, or the
representatives of constitutional authorities.

It was also, in the eye of the law, only as separate individuals, each acting
for himself, and exercising simply his natural rights as an individual, that the
people at large assented to, and ratified the Declaration.

It was also only as so many individuals, each acting for himself, and
exercising simply his natural rights, that they revolutionized the
constitutional character of their local governments, (so as to exclude the idea
of allegiance to Great Britain); changing their forms only as and when their
convenience dictated.

The whole Revolution, therefore, as a Revolution, was declared and
accomplished by the people, acting separately as individuals, and exercising
each his natural rights, and not by their governments in the exercise of their
constitutional powers.

It was, therefore, as individuals, and only as individuals, each acting for
himself alone, that they declared that their consent that is, their individual
consent for each one could consent only [*13] for himself --- was necessary to
the creation or perpetuity of any government that they could rightfully be
called on to support.

In the same way each declared, for himself, that his own will, pleasure, and
discretion were the only authorities he had any occasion to consult, In
determining whether he would any longer support the government under which be
had always lived. And if this action of each individual were valid and rightful
when he had so many other individuals to keep him company, it would have been,
in the view of natural justice and right, equally valid and rightful, if he had
taken the same step alone. He had the same natural right to take up arms alone
to defend his own property against a single tax-gatherer, that he had to take up
arms in company with three millions of others, to defend the property of all
against an army of tax-gatherers.

Thus the whole Revolution turned upon, asserted, and, in theory, established,
the right of each and every man, at his discretion, to release himself from the
support of the government under which he had lived. And this principle was
asserted, not as a right peculiar to themselves, or to that time, or as
applicable only to the government then existing; but as a universal right of all
men, at all times, and under all circumstances.

George the Third called our ancestors traitors for what they did at that
time. But they were not traitors in fact, whatever he or his laws may have
called them. They were not traitors in fact, because they betrayed nobody, and
broke faith with nobody. They were his equals, owing him no allegiance,
obedience, nor any other duty, except such as they owed to mankind at large.
Their political relations with him had been purely voluntary. They had never
pledged their faith to him that they would continue these relations any longer
than it should please them to do so; and therefore they broke no faith in
parting with him. They simply exercised their natural right of saying to him,
and to the English people, that they were under no obligation to continue their
political connexion with them, and that, for reasons of their own, they chose to
dissolve it. [*14]

What was true of our ancestors, is true of revolutionists in general. The
monarchs and governments, from whom they choose to separate, attempt to
stigmatize them as traitors. But they are not traitors in fact; in-much they
betray, and break faith with, no one. Having pledged no faith, they break none.
They are simply men, who, for reasons of their own --- whether good or bad, wise
or unwise, is immaterial --- choose to exercise their natural right of
dissolving their connexion with the governments under which they have lived. In
doing this, they no more commit the crime of treason --- which necessarily
implies treachery, deceit, breach of faith --- than a man commits treason when
he chooses to leave a church, or any other voluntary association, with which he
has been connected.

This principle was a true one in 1776. It is a true one now. It is the only
one on which any rightful government can rest. It is the one on which the
Constitution itself professes to rest. If it does not really rest on that basis,
it has no right to exist; and it is the duty of every man to raise his hand
against it.

If the men of the Revolution designed to incorporate in the Constitution the
absurd ideas of allegiance and treason, which they had once repudiated, against
which they had fought, and by which the world had been enslaved, they thereby
established for themselves an indisputable claim to the disgust and detestation
of all mankind.

____________

In subsequent numbers, the author hopes to show that, under the principle of
individual consent, the little government that mankind need, is not only
practicable, but natural and easy; and that the Constitution of the United
States authorizes no government, except one depending wholly on voluntary
support.

No
Treason, No. 2

No Treason, No. 2 ›

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